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ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence (AI) has been applied in phishing email
detection. Typically, it requires rich email data from a collec-
tion of sources, and the data usually contains private infor-
mation that needs to be preserved. So far, AI techniques are
solely focusing on centralized data training that eventually
accesses sensitive raw email data from the collected data
repository. Thus, a privacy-friendly AI technique such as
federated learning (FL) is a desideratum. FL enables learning
over distributed email datasets to protect their privacy with-
out the requirement of accessing them during the learning in
a distributed computing framework. This work, to the best
of our knowledge, is the first to investigate the applicability
of training email anti-phishing model via FL.
Building upon the deep neural network model, in particu-
lar, Recurrent Convolutional Neural Network for phishing
email detection, we comprehensively measure and evalu-
ate the FL-entangled learning performance under various
settings, including balanced and imbalanced data distribu-
tion among clients, scalability, communication overhead, and
transfer learning. Our results positively corroborate compa-
rable performance statistics of FL in phishing email detec-
tion to centralized learning. As a trade-off to privacy and
distributed learning, FL has a communication overhead of
0.179 GB per global epoch per its clients. Our measurement-
based results find that FL is suitable for practical scenarios,
where data size variation, including the ratio of phishing to
legitimate email samples, among the clients, are present. In
all these scenarios, FL shows a similar performance of testing
accuracy of around 98%. Besides, we demonstrate the integra-
tion of the newly joined clients with time in FL via transfer
learning to improve the client-level performance. The trans-
fer learning-enabled training results in the improvement of
the testing accuracy by up to 2.6% and fast convergence.
1 INTRODUCTION
Email is the most usual means of formal communication. At
the same time, it is exploited as a common tool for phishing
attacks, where attackers disguise as a trustworthy entity and
try to install malware or obtain sensitive information such
as login credentials and bank details of the recipient. Based
on the phishing and email fraud statistics 2019 [40], phishing
accounts for 90% of data breaches, which leads to an average
financial loss of $3.86 million. Moreover, phishing attacks
cost American business half a billion dollars a year [28], and
it is increasing. Recently, COVID-19 drives phishing emails
up to an unprecedented level by over 600% [32].
Correspondingly, there are various techniques devised to
protect users from phishing attacks. These techniques can
be generally divided into two categories, namely traditional
methods, and artificial intelligence (AI) based methods. The
traditional method is verification based, where emails are
filtered out by comparingwith references, specifically, known
email formats, which relies on either a list of phishing emails
(blacklist), or a list of legitimate emails (whitelist), or the con-
tents of the known phishing emails. However, email formats
can be easily manipulated with time by the attackers, which
renders traditional method inefficient. AI-based methods
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learn to classify an email as phishing or legitimate with a
high probability (e.g., 0.99848 [11]). This method is context
aware, and it can continuously learn from the newly avail-
able email data samples and adapts to handle the new attack
formats/cases efficiently on time.
AI-based methods can be further broadly classified into
two parts, namely conventional ML-based and deep learn-
ing (DL) based methods. The performance of a conventional
ML-based method depends on delicate feature selection (e.g.,
semantic and syntax) and processing. Such feature engineer-
ing usually requires domain knowledge and trials, so that it is
time-consuming and laborious, which hinders improvements
against evolving threats. Moreover, it is hard to capture full
contextual information of email data. Naive Bayes, Support
Vector Machine, and Decision Tree are examples of conven-
tional ML-based methods [8]. On the contrary, a DL-based
method feeds the input directly to the system, and it extracts
the critical features and the contextual information by itself.
This contributes to high efficiency as well as better perfor-
mance. Convolutional Neural Network [26] and Recurrent
Convolutional Neural Network [11] are typical examples
of the DL-based method. Although DL-based methods are
preferable over other methods considering its performance
and automated feature engineering, as a trade-off, it requires
a considerable amount of email data.
Unfortunately, emails are sensitive to clients, and disclo-
sure to third parties is not preferred. Thus, the organisa-
tions or companies are reluctant to share their email data
for the improvement of the anti-phishing DL model. Even
anonymization of the email is problematic because it can be
easily circumvented — attackers can exploit various char-
acteristics, e.g., social graphs to re-identify the victim’s en-
tity [14]. As such, it is non-trivial to aggregate emails for
centralized analysis. Besides, a recent work [20] emphasizes
the strict ethical concerns when accessing and analyzing the
emails of 92 organizations even with the access permission.
Along with access control, strict rules are required to be
followed: Firstly, the emails are encrypted during fetching;
secondly, only authorized employees at the email analyzing
agent can access the data (under the standard, strict access
control policies); thirdly, personally identifying information
or sensitive data disclosed to the authorized employees must
not be shared with others; once the model is built, all the en-
crypted email must be deleted [7]. For any purpose, improp-
erly centralized data management could violate specific rules
such as reusing the data indiscriminately and risk-agnostic
data processing [42] required by General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) [10] and HIPAA [3]. Therefore, even with
the users’ permission to use their data for agreed tasks (e.g.,
DL), handling the email data under a centralized cloud is
still risky under the set of privacy regulations. Overall, there
is an urgent need to process a DL-based method without
accessing the raw email data for anti-phishing purposes.
Recently, collaborative learning among a large number of
participants has become popular, where a joint DL model
can be trained by harvesting the rich distributed data held by
each participant without accessing them. One most popular
technique is federated learning (FL) [6, 21, 29]. To the best of
our knowledge, the applicability of FL for email anti-phishing
has not been explicitly investigated. In this paper, we take
the first empirical measurement of email anti-phishing per-
formance by leveraging FL.
1.1 Our contributions
This work examines the following five research questions
that aim to capture the practical scenarios and challenges.
RQ1 (Distributed email learning) Can FL be applied
to learn from distributed email repositories to
achieve a comparable model accuracy as the DL
anti-phishing models trained on centralized
email repository? Based on the measurements, FL
achieves a comparable performance to centralized
learning. For example, 98.852% of testing accuracywith
two clients. Though centralized learning has slightly
higher (e.g., by 0.466%) testing accuracy, it is not pri-
vacy friendly. Thus for email learning with privacy,
FL can be a suitable technique in phishing detection.
Details are provided in Section 4.1.
RQ2 (Scalability) Howwould the number of clients af-
fect FL accuracy and convergence? Based on the
measurements, an increase in the number of clients in
FL has a slightly negative effect on the convergence of
the accuracy curve and its maximum value. However,
more clients (more email datasets) can be available in
the FL model training for phishing detection. RQ5 ad-
dresses some benefits to accuracy. Details are provided
in Section 4.2.
RQ3 (Communication overhead) What is the commu-
nication overhead resulting fromFL? Based on the
measurements, FL has a communication overhead as
a trade-off to privacy. We quantify the overhead and
find it the same of around 0.179GB for all cases of up to
twenty clients under our setting. Details are provided
in Section 4.3.
RQ4 (Imbalanced data setup) Can we learn from vari-
ous clients who have different sizes of local
datasets in FL? Based on the measurements, FL per-
forms well over imbalanced data distribution, includ-
ing different phishing to legitimate email ratios. More
precisely, the performance is similar despite imbal-
anced data distribution among clients, thus making FL
suitable in these scenarios. Details are in Section 4.4.
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RQ5 (Transfer learning)Canweutilize the pre-trained
model on a similar dataset for a better perfor-
mance? This work implements transfer learning (TL)
to improve the client-level performance in the cases
where clients available with time in the training pro-
cess. A fast convergence in the accuracy curve and an
increase in its maximum value are observed with TL.
Details are in Section 4.5.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Centralized learning
Centralized learning (CL) is normally performed by aggre-
gating all available datasets (e.g., phishing and legitimate
emails) at one central repository. Then it performs central-
ized machine learning on the aggregated dataset. Refer to
Algorithm 1 for more information. During the learning pro-
cess, a modeler has access to the raw data, which is shared by
one or more clients, thus making it unsuitable if the data is
private such as email samples. Besides, in the era of big data
and deep learning, it is non-trivial to maintain the required
resources, including storage and computation, in CL. Thus,
recently, there is a rise in distributed learning such as, in
particular, FL.
2.2 Federated learning
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Figure 1: An overview of federated learning.
Federated learning [29] allows parallel DL training
across distributed clients, and pushes the computation to the
edge devices (i.e., clients). Figure 1 illustrates an overview of
FL. There are four exemplified clients with their local email
datasets and one coordinating server. Firstly, each client i
trains the model on their local email datasets Di and produce
the local modelW it at time instance t , for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Sec-
ondly, all clients upload their local models to the server. Then
the server performs the weighted averaging (i.e., aggrega-
tion) of the local models and updates the global modelWt+1.
Finally, the global model is broadcast to all clients, and this
completes the one round of FL process. This process contin-
ues until the model converges. In FL, the server synchronizes
the training process across the clients. Over the entire train-
ing process, only the models (i.e., model parameters) are
transmitted between the clients and the server. Thus, a client
(e.g., financial institution) does not require to share their raw
email data to the server (e.g., coordinated by an email ana-
lyzer) during the training process. Thus, the data are always
local and confidential that makes FL a privacy-preserving
technique.
2.3 Transfer learning
D1
Wt
D2
Wt’
t t’
P11
P22
P21
Figure 2: An overview of transfer learning.
Transfer learning [38] utilizes the pre-trained ML model
in the related dataset to the current dataset. It provides a
faster convergence and good performance in the current
dataset due to the transfer of the previous knowledge in
the related dataset. Figure 2 illustrates an example overview
of transfer learning in the similar dataset. Firstly, at time t ,
modelWt trains on the email dataset D1 with a performance
(e.g., accuracy) of P11. Secondly, at time t ′,Wt trains on the
email datasetD2 and evolves toWt ′ , which has a performance
of P22 on D2, and P21 on D1. The transfer learning focuses on
the improvement of the P22 on D2, and does not care about
P21 on D1. It is applicable both in CL and FL settings, and
useful to train the model even with fewer data samples.
3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
3.1 Datasets
In this work, phishing and legitimate email samples are col-
lected from three popular sources, namely First Security
and Privacy Analytics Anti-Phishing Shared Task (IWSPA-
AP) [23], NazarioâĂŹs phishing corpora(Nazario) [33], and
Enron Email Dataset (Enron) [39]. The dataset contains email
samples with both header1 and without header: IWSPA-AP
has both types, whereas all email samples in Nazario and
Enron have the header accompanied by the body. Overall,
the data source includes Wikileaks archives, SpamAssassin,
IT departments of different universities, synthetic emails
1Email header precedes the email body and contains information of the
header fields, including To, Subject, Received, Content-Type, Return-Path, and
Authentication-Results.
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Figure 3: An overview of THEMIS model.
created by Data engine [35], Enron (emails generated by
employees of Enron corporation), and Nazario (personal col-
lection). To provide more insight into the email samples, we
present some frequently appeared words in them as follows:
• IWSPA-AP phishing email (a) with header includes
account, PayPal, please, eBay, link, security, update,
bank, online, and information, and (b) without header
includes text, account, email, please, information, click,
team, online, and security. IWSPA-AP legitimate email
(a) with header includes email, please, new, sent, party,
people, Donald, state, and president, and (b) without
header includes text, link, national, US, Trump, and
democratic.
• Nazario includes important, account, update, please,
email, security, PayPal, eBay, bank, access, information,
item, click, confirm, and service.
• Enron includes text, plain, subject, please, email, power,
image, time, know, this, message, information, and en-
ergy.
We have considered the updated email dataset from the
sources till this date, e.g., Nazario’s phishing corpus 2019.
In total, the experimental dataset has 23475 email samples,
and Table 1 shows the number of emails extracted from each
source.
Table 1: The number of email samples.
Source Phishing (P) Legitimate (L) P+L
IWSPA-AP 1132 9174 10306
Nazario 8890 0 8890
Enron 0 4279 4279
Total 10022 13453 23475
3.2 DL model selection: THEMIS model
THEMIS is one of the recent models, which has been
demonstrated to be highly effective for phishing email detec-
tion. It employs Recurrent Convolutional Neural Network
(RCNNs) and models emails at multiple levels, including
char-level email header, word-level email header, char-level
email body, and word-level email body [11]. This way, it cap-
tures the deep underlying semantics of the phishing emails
efficiently and consequently making THEMIS better than
existing DL-based methods, that are limited to the natural
language processing and deep learning [27].
Model Overview: Fig. 3 illustrates a system overview
of the THEMIS model. Firstly, THEMIS extracts the char-
level and word-level of email header and body, and then an
embedding layer converts all these levels to the respective
vector representation. Afterward, it feeds each vector repre-
sentation into RCNN model [24] and learns a representation
for the email header and email body, respectively. THEMIS
RCNN consists of four Bidirectional-Long Short-Term Mem-
ory (Bi-LSTM) that obtain the left and right semantic infor-
mation of a specific location with its embedding information
from the above four vectors, thus forming something called
a triple. Next, these triples are mapped into specified dimen-
sions using a tanh activation function. The longitudinal max
polling is then applied to obtain four different representa-
tions, which will be paired to form only two representations
for the header and the body. As the email header representa-
tion and body representation have varying degrees of impact
on phishing detection, an attention mechanism is applied
to compute a weighted sum of the two representations, and
this produces an ultimate representation of the whole email,
which is further processed to produce the classification re-
sult. For more details of the THEMIS model, we refer readers
to [11].
It is reported that THEMIS can achieve up to 99.848%
of overall testing accuracy. Considering its high efficacy in
phishing detection, we thus chose this model as a CL baseline
across all our FL-based experiment settings.
3.3 Data preparation
The email dataset has two types of file formats, viz text file
(.txt), and mbox file (.mbox). Each email is a single text file if
the email sample is in the text format. In the mbox format, all
messages are concatenated and stored as plain text in a single
file. Moreover, each message starts with the four characters
"From" followed by a space. Both types of the email files are
firstly parsed into two parts, namely email header and email
body, and then subjected to further processing, including
cleaning and tokenization to produce char level and word
level sequences (described in the following paragraph). By
considering equal phishing and legitimate email samples
from the total dataset (of 23475 data samples), we prepare
the experimental dataset of size 20044 (i.e., 2×10022) — to be
precise, 10022 is aligned with the number of phishing emails
while the number of legitimate emails is 13453. Moreover, the
new dataset has four parts - phishing header, phishing body,
legitimate header, and legitimate body - each part with 10022
samples. The experimental dataset is equally and uniformly
distributed in all our distributed setup with multiple clients
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except for the cases with the imbalanced dataset (where the
number of phishing and legitimate email samples varies with
the case). For example, cases with five clients have a dataset
of size 4008 (i.e., around 20044 divided by 5) in each client.
For all experiments, the training-to-testing data split ratio is
80:20.
3.3.1 Extraction of Header and Body. The classHeader of the
python module, called email.header [12], is used to extract
the email header, and this separates the header and body part
of the email samples. In the header section, we consider only
the Subject and the Content-Type field, which are deemed
essential for phishing detection. This separation is done by
using the python library called the regular expression (RE)
module [22].
3.3.2 Cleaning of the Extracted Header and Body. The python
library Beautiful Soup 4 [17] and HTML parser [36] are used
to clean the text information in HTML format. Besides, we
use RE for the plain text (both in header and body) cleaning
by removing punctuation and non-alphabetic characters. To
filter out the stop words from the header and body, we use
stopwords of the nltk packages (nltk.corpus) [5] of python.
3.3.3 Tokenisation. To get the char-level and word-level se-
quences of the tokens for both header and body parts, the
Tokenizer class provided by Keras library [37] is used. Basi-
cally, this is to encode each character/word as a unique inte-
ger as required by the input format of the embedding layer.
Two main functions are used for tokenization; these are âĂŸ-
fit_on_texts,âĂŹ which updates internal vocabulary based
on a list of texts, and âĂŸtexts_to_sequences,âĂŹ which
transforms each text in texts to a sequence of integers by
considering only words known by the tokenizer. In all our
measurements, we keep 50, 100, 150, and 300 as the length of
the four sequences of tokens, which are word-level header,
char-level header, word-level body, and char-level body, re-
spectively.
3.4 Experimental steps
For the purpose of performance measurements, we use High-
performance Computing (HPC) platform that is built on Dell
EMC’s PowerEdge platform. It has the Tesla P100-SXM2-16GB
GPU model. All code is written in Python 3.6.1, and the
THEMIS model, that has a RCNN, is implemented by us-
ing TensorFlow 2.2.5 [1] and Keras 2.2.5 [44] framework.
In all measurements, we keep the same random seed, i.e.,
random.seed(123). We run centralized model training and
federated model training under various settings in our exper-
iments, but with the same learning rate of 0.0001 and batch
size of 256. Refer to Algorithm 1 and 2 for details on training
steps of CL and FL, respectively.
Algorithm 1: Centralized learning
Input: Email dataset (n = 20044 email samples)
Output:Model performance (Accuracy, F1-score, Precision
and Recall)
/* Runs once at the beginning of the training */
1 Email dataset preparation:
2 Data extraction: Extract and clean the text header and
body from the raw phishing and legitimate email
samples;
3 Setup the phishing to legit email data size ratio (e.g.,
50:50);
4 Train/test split: Separate the cleaned body and header data
into 80% and 20% training and test dataset, respectively;
5 Tokenization: Conversion of the training and testing
datasets into char-level and word-level sequences of the
body and header, respectively;
6 Initialize THEMIS modelWt ;
/* Training/testing THEMIS model Wt for a global epoch
E on the total email dataset with n samples */
7 for e ∈ E do
8 for b ∈ B do
9 Training and testingWt ; // batch size B = 256
10 Evaluate training/testing performance;
11 end
12 end
4 MEASURED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To ease the presentation of the measurement results on the
experimental setup (Section 3), we divide this section into
five parts according to the five research questions. Each part
addresses one research question, providing corresponding
results and conclusion/discussion.
4.1 Distributed email learning
RQ 1. Can FL be applied to learn from distributed
email repositories to achieve a comparable model ac-
curacy as the DL anti-phishing models trained on cen-
tralized email repository?
Figure 4 depicts the model testing and training conver-
gences of accuracy curves with the global epoch for CL and
FLwith two, five, and ten clients. For the observationwindow
of 45 global epochs, the figure demonstrates a training accu-
racy of 99.838% in CL, and 99.794% in FL (with two clients).
Besides, the maximum testing accuracy is 99.351% in CL2 and
2The accuracy in the THEMIS paper [11] is 99.848%, which is slightly higher
than the accuracy in our experiment. This can be due to various reasons,
including email data samples, sample size, and model hyper-parameters.
We consider email samples with and without headers, but THEMIS paper
studies only with the header. Besides, our dataset is up to date with 23475
samples, whereas THEMIS paper has 8780 samples.
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Algorithm 2: Federated learning
Input: Email dataset
Output:Model performance (Accuracy, F1-score, Precision
and Recall)
/* Server-side */
1 Server:
2 Initialize and send global THEMIS modelWt to all K
clients;
/* Executes for a global epoch E */
3 for e ∈ E do
4 for each client k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} in parallel do
5 W kt ← ClientUpdate(W kt ) ; // local updates
6 end
7 Perform weighted averaging and update the global
model:Wt+1 ← ∑Kk=1 nkn W kt ;
8 Send the updated global modelWt+1 to all clients;
9 end
/* Client-side at each client k */
10 ClientUpdate(W kt ):
/* Runs once at the beginning of the training */
11 Email dataset preparation:
12 Data extraction: Extract and clean the text header and
body from the raw phishing and legitimate email
samples;
13 Setup the phishing to legit email data size ratio (e.g.,
50:50);
14 Train/test split: Separate the cleaned body and header
data into 80% and 20% training and test dataset,
respectively;
15 Tokenization: Conversion of the training and testing
datasets into char-level and word-level sequences of
the body and header respectively;
/* Runs repetitively during the training/testing */
16 while global THEMIS modelWt is received from the
server do
17 SetW kt =Wt ;
/* Training/testing on the local email dataset
having nk samples */
18 for b ∈ B do
19 Train the THEMIS modelW kt ; // batch size
B = 256
20 Evaluate training/testing performance;
21 end
22 Send locally trainedW kt to Server;
23 end
98.852% in FL. This shows that CL marginally outperforms
(by 0.499%) the FL (with two clients) in this case. However,
the overall performance of the FL is notable and comparable
to CL. Refer to Figure 11 in Appendix A.1 for more results.
As FL is performed without sharing any private email
contents to the central repository (data always reside in the
client), the convergences of the FL training and testing clearly
show that the answer to the RQ1 is affirmative. Besides
privacy, FL is computationally efficient than CL since the
computation (ML training/testing) is distributed among the
clients. In this setup, we reasonably assume that the email
organisations (clients) are with resourceful computation to
jointly training FL model to preserve the privacy of email
samples.
4.2 Scalability
RQ 2. How would the number of clients affect FL ac-
curacy and convergence?
Figure 4 illustrates the results from the measurement with
two, five, and ten clients in FL. It shows that the maximum
training accuracy of 99.794%, 99.576%, and 98.666% accuracy
in FL with two, five, and ten clients, respectively. For the
testing set, the maximum accuracy is 98.852%, 97.731%, and
96.85% for FL corresponding to two, five, and ten clients, re-
spectively. It is not surprising that the convergence is slower,
and performance gradually degraded with the increase in the
number of clients. For more measurement results, refer to
Figure 11 in Appendix A.1. It is expected that the number of
clients/organisations participated in anti-phishing is usually
limited, e.g., ten, correspondingly, the performance degrada-
tion resulted from an increasing number of participants is
thus constrained.
4.3 Communication overhead
RQ 3. What is the communication overhead resulting
from FL?
Herein, we quantify the communication overhead in FL
with two, five, ten, and twenty clients. For the overhead, we
measure the data uploaded (i.e., a sum of the data packet size
ofW kt and nk ) and download (i.e., data packet size ofWt+1)
to and from the server, respectively, and it is averaged by
the total number of the participating clients. In CL, we do
not consider a client-server setup; thus, the communication
overhead is zero. On the other hand, FL has communication
overhead as a trade-off to preserve data privacy. For example,
in two client setup, the average total communication size per
global epoch per client is 0.178794768 GB and 0.178794749 GB
during upload to the server and download from the server,
respectively. Figure 5 illustrates the results. It shows that
the communication overhead per client per global epoch is
the same for all cases of up to twenty clients. The consis-
tent communication overhead over multiple clients makes
FL suitable for distributed training with a large number of
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Convergence curves of (a) testing accuracy
and (b) training accuracy in centralized and federated
learning (FL) with two, five, and ten clients.
Figure 5: Average data communication in centralized
and federated learning (FL) with various number of
clients.
clients. Moreover, the overhead can be easily addressed by a
well-connected setup with wired or wireless connections be-
tween the server and clients participated in the anti-phishing
framework. There is a slight difference in the upload size and
the download size because at each client in FL, the download
is always the weights of the model, whereas the upload is
the weights of the model and the size of the local datasets
(which is required to carry out weighted model averaging in
server based on Algorithm 2).
4.4 Imbalanced Data
RQ 4. Can we learn from various participants who
have different sizes of local datasets in FL?
So far, we have considered equal data distribution across
the clients. Now in this measurement, we examine the perfor-
mance of FL under an imbalanced data setup. In this regard,
we consider two, five and ten clients, and variation in the
local data sizes based on the maximum percentage of the vari-
ation provided by the term “var.” For example, if var = 10%,
then the variation of the data across the five clients is given
by [−10%,−5%, 0%,+5%,+10%], where -10% referred to the
10% less local data, and +10% referred to the 10% more data
in the respective clients. This means, 3606, 3806, 4008, 4208,
and 4408 local data samples are resided in clients 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5, respectively, if var = 10%. This way, we create a variation
of the sizes of the local data by maintaining the total size of
the datasets. In this measurement, we perform two experi-
ments; firstly, by keeping the phishing to legitimate email
samples ratio the same for all clients (i.e., 50:50 of phishing
and legitimate email samples), and secondly with unequal
ratio among clients.
Figure 6: Testing accuracy curves showing the impact
of different local data sizes provided by different var
among clients to their convergence in FL with five
clients.
4.4.1 Same phishing to legitimate email samples ratio across
clients. The result of our measurement for 10%, 20%, 50%, and
80% variations in the sizes of the local dataset in FL among
five clients is depicted in Figure 6, which shows that the
convergence of the test accuracy curves fluctuate slightly
until the global epoch of 10, then remains stable afterwards.
All cases with different var maintain an overall testing accu-
racy of around 98%. Similar trend is persistent in the training
phase. Refer to Figures 18 and 19 in Appendix A.3 for more
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results. Besides, the convergence trend is also similar for
the cases with two and ten clients. For details, refer to Fig-
ure 12, 13 and 14 in Appendix A.2, and Figure 22, 23 and
24 in Appendix A.4. The similarity in performance despite
variations in the local data sizes amongst clients indicate the
FL’s resilience (mostly enabled by weighted averaging) to
the data size variations.
4.4.2 Different legit email to phishing email samples ratio
across clients. Figure 7 depicts the results of our measure-
ment for FL among five clients having the same size of the
local dataset but all with (i) 10:90 (first case), (ii) 30:70 (sec-
ond case), and (iii) 70:30 (third case) phishing to legitimate
email samples (P/L) ratios. We choose the specific ratios for
the test purpose so that the P/L ratio remains distinct. This
setup is more practical than the setup with the same P/L
ratio, as this has a bias in the samples. The measurements
in this section have var = 0. The figure shows that until the
global epoch of 15, there is a difference in the performance,
where the first case (i.e., 10:90 P/L ratio) with the lower phish-
ing email samples was not performing well compared with
other cases with higher phishing email samples. However,
after the epoch, all cases converge similarly to provide an
overall testing accuracy of around 98% (refer to Figure 21 in
Appendix A.3 for more results).
For the cases with two and ten clients, the results follow
the similar pattern as observed in the case with five clients.
However, the performance of the case with 10:90 P/L ratio
jumps at different global epochs; jumps after 5 and 27 global
epochs in the cases with two clients and ten clients, respec-
tively. For details, refer to Figure 15, 16, 17, 25, and 26 in
Appendices A.2 and A.4.
Figure 7: Testing accuracy curves showing the impact
of different legit email to phishing email samples ra-
tios in the local dataset to their convergence in FLwith
five clients under various data distribution settings.
Based on the aforementioned results, the answer to the
RQ4 is affirmative, and FL demonstrates a similar overall
performance despite variations in the data distribution across
clients.
4.5 Transfer learning
RQ5. Canwe utilize the pre-trainedmodel on the sim-
ilar dataset for a better performance?
In this section, we perform three experiments to demon-
strate the effects and benefits of transfer learning in phishing
detection in distributed setup, which correspondingly an-
swer the above research question (RQ5).
4.5.1 Experiment 1: A client-level and overall effects of adding
one new client in FL via transfer learning. In this experiment,
we consider five clients in total, where the first four clients
(C1–C4) participate in the FL until 15 global epochs and train
the model collaboratively. Afterward, the transfer learning
is carried out only with the fifth client, and the training
proceeds for the next 15 global epochs (i.e., until 30 global
epochs). In other words, the model is only trained by the fifth
client for the last 15 epochs. Besides, for the performance
evaluation, the testing results are computed for all five clients
throughout the process. This experiment examines how a
newly joining client member can perform FL to improve its
performance in phishing detection compare to simply using
the pre-trained model (on a similar dataset) for the detection.
The experimental result depicted in Figure 8 is for the case
with var = 80, which provides the variations in the sizes
of the local dataset (i.e., [-80%, -40%, 0%, +40%, +80%]) to
capture a practical setting among the five clients. The figure
shows that the average test accuracy of the first four clients
is slightly higher than the fifth client (not participated in
the learning process) until 15 global epochs. Afterward, the
average testing accuracy of the fifth client improves by 2.6%
than the others since its training dataset trains the model.
This performance decreases with the lesser variation in the
sizes of the local dataset; for example, the improvement is
only 0.84% with var = 0. For more details, refer to Figure 27,
29 and 30 in Appendix A.5. Overall results show that the
evolved model (after training by client 5) is still relevant to
the first four clients (C1–C4) as their average testing results
with and without client 5 differ only nominally. Nonetheless,
the fifth client boosts the accuracy of phishing detection in
its local dataset by performing transfer learning under the
FL setup.
4.5.2 Experiment 2: A client-level and overall effects of con-
tinuously adding new clients in FL. In this experiment, the
learning process is started with the first client, and then one
new client is joined continuously at an interval of 10 global
epochs as the training proceeds. Refer to Table 2 for details.
This experiment simulates the practical cases where more
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(a)
(b)
Figure 8: Convergence curves of (a) testing accuracy
and (b) training accuracy from the Experiment 1 with
five clients and var = 80. The first four clients train the
model until 15 global epochs, and then (only) the fifth
client trains the model.
than one client (different than the Experiment 1) is avail-
able with time during model training and demonstrates how
the newly available clients can continue to perform FL to
contribute accuracy improvements for phishing detection.
Table 2: Experimental steps for the Experiment 2
Round Involvement of clients
0 to 9 Only the first client.
10 to 19 Only the first and second client.
20 to 29 Only the first, second and third client.
30 to 39 First, second, third and fourth client.
40 to 50 All five clients.
The local test accuracy is measured
for all clients throughout the process.
The result depicted in Figure 9 is for the case with the
same size of the local dataset among the five clients, which
(a)
(b)
Figure 9: Convergence curves of (a) testing accuracy
and (b) training accuracy from the Experiment 2 with
five clients and var = 0. The FL training starts with one
client, i.e., client 1, and a new client joins the train-
ing at every 10-th global epochs in a sequence from
client 2 to client 5.
are gradually added to the learning process, as stated in
Table 2. As per expectation, it shows that the testing accuracy
improves for each client when it is added to FL via transfer
learning. For example, the average testing accuracy jumps by
around 13% for client 2 when it joins client 1 in training the
model at global epoch 10. The testing performance is carried
out for all clients; however, the training result is carried
only when the client is involved in the model training. Thus,
the accuracy before a client joins the training is zero in
Figure 9(b). The performance pattern is similar for the case
with var = 80 (refer to Figure 31 in Appendix A.6).
4.5.3 Experiment 3: Benefits of the transfer learning to the
newly participated client in the learning process. In this ex-
periment, we analyze the performance of client 1, which
we assume a newly participating client, with and without
transfer learning. For this, we consider five clients with a
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variation in their dataset provided by var = 80 (this means
that client 1 has 80% fewer data samples than client 3). In
the transfer learning setup, the model is firstly trained by
the four clients (client 2 to client 5) for 15 global epochs,
and then the resulting model (pre-trained model) is further
trained by client 1 on its local email data samples. On the
other hand, for the case without transfer learning, client 1
performs CL on its local email dataset.
(a)
(b)
Figure 10: Convergence curves of (a) testing accuracy
and (b) training accuracy of client 1 in transfer learn-
ing and centralized learning.
The experimental result is depicted in Figure 10. It shows
that transfer learning outperforms CL along with a fast con-
vergence for client 1. Moreover, at the global epoch of 45,
the testing accuracy in transfer learning is 1.87% higher than
CL. For more results, refer to Figure 32 in Appendix A.7.
Based on the results from the above three experiments
in this section, it is clear that transfer learning is useful for
the performance boosting in phishing detection under the
federated setup.
5 RELATEDWORKS
5.1 Centralized learning in phishing
detection
A centralized email analysis based on AI-based methods
for phishing detection has been explored for a long time.
Conventional ML-based techniques such as decision trees,
logistic regression, random forests, AdaBoost, and support
vector machines are analyzed in phishing detection [2, 4,
18, 45–47]. These techniques are based on feature engineer-
ing, which requires in-depth domain knowledge and trials.
On the other hand, DL-based methods include deep neu-
ral networks [43], convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
[26], deep belief networks [50], bidirectional LSTM with su-
pervised attention [34], and recurrent convolutional neural
networks [11]. These works are mostly based on natural lan-
guage processing techniques for phishing detection. While
most existing works have focused on the effective detection
of general phishing emails, there are few works that con-
sider specialised phishing attacks, including spear phishing
attacks [15] and business email compromise attacks [7] in
specific contexts. Despite the usefulness, all the above works
operate under a setting where emails must be centralized for
analysis and thus do not provide privacy protection of email
datasets.
5.2 Cryptographic Deep Learning Training
There have been attempts on cryptographic approaches for
supporting DL model training over encrypted data, which
applies to the training of deep neural network models for
phishing email detection while preserving privacy. In [31],
Mohassel and Zhang propose the first system design Se-
cureML for privacy-preserving neural network training. In
their system, multiple data providers can secretly share their
data among two cloud servers, which will then conduct the
training procedure over the secret-shared data. They rely
on the secure computation techniques, e.g., secret sharing
and garbled circuits, to design a secure two-party computa-
tion protocol, allowing two cloud servers to compute in the
ciphertext domain the linear operations (addition and multi-
plication) as well as the non-linear activation functions. Later,
Wagh et al. [48] propose a design that works in the three-
server model and is purely based on the lightweight secret
sharing technique, with better performance than SecureML.
This work assumes an adversary model where none of the
three cloud servers will deviate from the protocol. The work
in [30] also operates under a similar three-server setting, yet
achieves more robust security against malicious adversaries
who deviate arbitrarily. This line of work presents valuable
research endeavours in enabling deep neural network train-
ing over encrypted data. Yet, it has to rely on additional
architectural assumptions (i.e., non-colluding cloud servers)
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and also incurs substantial performance overheads (up to
orders of magnitude slower) when compared to the plain
text baseline.
5.3 Federated Learning
FL is attractive, especially when the data is sensitive, like
in the financial sector (banks) and the medical sector (hos-
pitals) [41]. There have been several works in FL though
none of them specifically address phishing email detection.
Some works include the following: Google has used FL for
next-word prediction in a virtual keyboard for smartphones
words [19], Leroy et al. applied FL for speech keyword spot-
ting [25], Gao et al. [13] propose to use FL to train a joint
model over heterogeneous ECG medical data to preserve the
data privacy of each party, and Yang et al. [49] applied FL to
detect credit card fraud.
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
There are various other techniques such as homomorphic
encryption [16] (a cryptographic approach) and differential
privacy [9] used along with FL for guaranteed and provable
privacy, respectively. However, homomorphic encryption
increases computational overhead, and differential privacy
degrades the performance as a trade-off. The integration
of these techniques to FL in phishing detection remains as
future work.
7 CONCLUSION
This work took the first step to implement federated learn-
ing (FL) for privacy-preserving email phishing detection.
Built upon the state-of-art deep learning model that is deli-
cately designed for email phishing detection as a centralized
learning baseline, our comprehensive measurements under
FL demonstrated promising results while preserving the pri-
vacy of the email content. More specifically, the deep learning
model performance under FL was as good as that of central-
ized learning under various practical scenarios, including
imbalanced data distribution among clients. Besides, this
work leveraged transfer learning to enable fast convergence
of accuracy curves and improved accuracy in client-level
phishing detection.
In FL, the email data samples always reside in the email
data custodians, e.g., participating organizations in the phish-
ing detection from different geographic locations, and data is
not shared among the participants. Thus, considering this in-
herent privacy-preservation feature, it potentially unleashes
the willingness of more clients (thus more data) contributing
to the deep learning in email phishing detection to improve
the model performance, including the client-level perfor-
mance, by harnessing data integration in FL as illustrated in
this paper.
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A SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS
A.1 Distributed learning and Scalability
(additional result)
Figure 11: Testing results providing the precision, recall,
and F1-score at the global epoch of 45 in centralized and fed-
erated learning (FL) with two, five, and ten clients.
A.2 Imbalanced data setup - two clients
(additional cases)
Figure 12: Testing accuracy curves showing the impact of
different local data sizes provided by different var among
clients to their convergence in federated learning with two
clients.
Figure 13: Training accuracy curves showing the impact of
different local data sizes provided by different var among
clients to their convergence in federated learning with two
clients.
Figure 14: Testing results providing the precision, recall,
and F1-score at the global epoch of 45 in federated learning
with two clients under various data distribution settings cre-
ated by different var.
Figure 15: Testing accuracy curves showing the impact of
different legit email to phishing email samples ratios in the
local dataset to their convergence in federated learningwith
two clients under various data distribution settings.
Figure 16: Training accuracy curves showing the impact of
different legit email to phishing email samples ratios in the
local dataset to their convergence in federated learningwith
two clients under various data distribution settings.
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Figure 17: Testing results providing the precision, recall,
and F1-score at the global epoch of 45 in federated learning
with two clients under various phishing to legitimate email
samples ratios (P:L) in the local dataset.
A.3 Imbalanced data setup - five clients
(additional results)
Figure 18: Training accuracy curves showing the impact of
different local data sizes provided by different var among
clients to their convergence in federated learning (FL) with
five clients.
Figure 19: Testing results providing the precision, recall,
and F1-score at the global epoch 45 in federated learning
with five clients under various data distribution settings cre-
ated by different var.
Figure 20: Training accuracy curves showing the impact of
different legit email to phishing email samples ratios in the
local dataset in federated learning with five clients under
various data distribution settings.
Figure 21: Testing results providing the precision, recall,
and F1-score at the global epoch of 45 in federated learning
withfive clients under different phishing to legitimate email
samples ratios (P:L) in the local dataset.
A.4 Imbalanced data setup - ten clients
(additional cases)
Figure 22: Testing accuracy curves showing the impact of
different local data sizes provided by different var among
clients to their convergence in federated learning with ten
clients.
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Figure 23: Training accuracy curves showing the impact of
different local data sizes provided by different var among
clients to their convergence in federated learning with ten
clients.
Figure 24: Testing results providing the precision, recall
and F1-score at the global epoch of 45 in federated learning
with ten clients under various data distribution settings cre-
ated by different var.
(a)
(b)
Figure 25: (a) Testing accuracy and (b) training accuracy
curves showing the impact of different legit email to phish-
ing email samples ratios in the local dataset to their conver-
gence in federated learning with ten clients under various
data distribution settings.
Figure 26: Testing results providing the precision, recall,
and F1-score at the global epoch of 45 in federated learning
with ten clients under various phishing to legitimate email
samples ratios (P:L) in the local dataset.
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A.5 Transfer learning - Experiment 1
(additional cases)
Figure 27: Convergence curves of testing accuracy from
the Experiment 1 with five clients and var = 0. The first
four clients train the model until 15 global epochs, and then
(only) the fifth client trains the model.
Figure 28: Convergence curves of training accuracy from
the Experiment 1 with five clients and var = 0. The first
four clients train the model until 15 global epochs, and then
(only) the fifth client trains the model.
(a)
(b)
Figure 29: Convergence curves of (a) testing accuracy and
(b) training accuracy from the Experiment 1with five clients
and var = 30. The first four clients train the model until
15 global epochs, and then (only) the fifth client trains the
model.
(a)
(b)
Figure 30: Convergence curves of (a) testing accuracy and
(b) training accuracy from the Experiment 1with five clients
and var = 50. The first four clients train the model until
15 global epochs, and then (only) the fifth client trains the
model.
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A.6 Transfer learning - Experiment 2
(additional case)
(a)
(b)
Figure 31: Convergence curves of (a) testing accuracy and
(b) training accuracy from the Experiment 2with five clients
and var = 80. In federated learning, the training starts with
one client, i.e., client 1, and a new client joins the training
at every 10-th global epochs in a sequence from client 2 to
client 5.
A.7 Transfer learning - Experiment 3
(additional result)
Figure 32: Testing results providing precision, recall, and
F1-score at the global epoch of 45 in Experiment 3 (transfer
learning).
